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FOUNDATION FOR CO-EXISTENCE, SRI LANKA

- Stop Killing - Notice issued in Trincomalee by FCE CO - EXISTENCE Partners

- High Tables and Small Tables - Kumar Rupesinghe, Sri Lanka

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[Stop Killing - Notice issued in Trincomalee by FCE CO - EXISTENCE Partners]

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03.12.2004, jpUf;Nfhzkiy


High Tables and Small Tables
[By : Kumar Rupesinghe, Sri Lanka]

In most internal conflicts, negotiations are seen within an interstate paradigm, where the attention is focused on the resumption of talks between two belligerent forces at a high table. This paradigm is based on realist concepts, which essentially recognise the military balance of power. Ceasefire agreements are based on a military balance of power. This kind of paradigm focused too much attention on the high table. The treatment of protracted internal conflicts are different to inter state conflicts and requires systematic peace building efforts from below to compliment the work of the high table. This is one of the most lessons that can be drawn from protracted conflicts elsewhere. The media and press further emphasise and direct all focus towards the high table, and when the high table talks collapse the situation is allowed to drift.

In the Sri Lankan context, in the six previous rounds of negotiations, there was considerable media hype about the two parties meeting in different places in the world. All the focus of attention was on the results of the high table, with both sides claiming that the talks were successful until we all woke to be told that the talks had collapsed. In subsequent statements spokesmen for the LTTE claimed that nothing had been achieved in the six round of talks!

Getting to the high table should not deflect attention to other problems that involve the sustainability of the peace process as a whole. In the case of Sri Lanka there have been protracted negotiations to resolve a protracted conflict. The lessons that we can learn from these protracted negotiations are that the parties were not prepared for the talks and were not willing to compromise on their positions. The result of a failure in negotiations is that there is considerable escalation of violence. In the case of Sri Lanka every failure in the talks led to a massive escalation of violence and destruction, and the rearming of both sides.

Sri Lanka is fortunate in having significant attention by the International community. The international community is rightly focused on getting the parties to the table. However successful conflict resolution happens at a particular pace and dynamic - it cannot be forced and predetermined. In the current negotiation process in Sri Lanka, efforts by the international community to impose conditionalities á la Tokyo created a situation where the LTTE did not attend the donor conference claiming that they did not wish to be brought into a peace trap. Even more serious was the conditionality imposed by the co-chairs that significant resources would not be transferred to Sri Lanka until the talks begin. Once again emphasis is placed on the imperative of a resumption of talks. The problems of relief, rehabilitation and development are postponed until the illusory talks begin. The donors may well be advised to also focus on supporting peace building efforts on the ground as an essential component of the transformation process.

The Politics of Stalemate

In war stalemate is a situation where no further progress can be made through military force. It is also a situation where negotiations are stalled and the parties find it unable to resume talks. A situation of stalemate can be a period where creative actions can be taken. We need to deepen our understanding of long drawn out stalemates in conflict situations. Stalemate is better than a return to war!

Peace building

Peace building is an attempt to promote co-existence in war-torn situations and unravel intractable issues. Peace building is not based on a military balance of power, but rather on the pursuit of human security. It is important to distinguish human security from state security, and move from state-centred towards human-centred approaches to security. This requires us to broaden our view of peace. As Kofi Annan said: "Peace means more than the absence of war. … Human Security embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. ... Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human - and therefore - national security."

Human security requires a full transformation of our societies. This goes beyond only a peace accord. Conflict transformation is to reduce intractability on a variety of fronts so that transformation is possible. Whilst the realist paradigm focuses on conflict management, a civil society paradigm focuses on conflict transformation. In any protracted conflict there are a considerable number of intractable issues. Intractability means hardened positions, significant obstacles and mindsets, and structures which require transformation and change. Focusing on intractability means melting the glacier and transforming the contours of intractability and helping to transform obstacles into opportunities.

If we take this as a point of departure then we can argue that, whilst high table negotiations should remain on the agenda, there should also be a large number of smaller tables or forums where other intractable issues are addressed. This can be the role of civil society, whether they are the actions of NGOs, civil society institutions or religious institutions. This is called Track 2.

The mediation that Track 2 can provide helps to reduce intractability through more informal frameworks and environments where protagonists can meet and discuss issues. This can be done through problem solving workshops and many other forms of dialogic processes outside the limelight of the media.

Reducing Intractability in Sri Lanka

Building Consensus

One of the key areas of intractability in Sri Lanka is the lack of consensus in the South. Building consensus in the South has been one of the most difficult and problematic areas of the political culture of Sri Lanka. Here, in spite of all difficulties, efforts must be made to create a bi-partisan consensus on the negotiations process. The Mano-Malik talks during the last phase of the UNF period are an excellent example where representatives of both sides were able to meet away from the glare of publicity, discuss many problematic issues and come to consensus. These kinds of informal meetings should be encouraged.

The Muslim Dimension

Another key area in reducing intractability in the Sri Lankan conflict is the need to find resolution for the Tamil-Muslim dimension in the Northeast. In the Eastern Province much progress has been made in bringing representatives of the LTTE and the Muslim communities together to tackle some of these issues. This includes the North Eastern Muslim Peace Assembly (NEMPA) agreement with the LTTE regional commanders in the Eastern Province that promotes conflict resolution and reconciliation. What is important is that at least in the Eastern Province the relations between Muslims and Tamil are being improved and in large part due to peace building efforts at the Track 2 level.

The problem of the return of Muslims to their land in the North remains particularly difficult and complex. Even here though initial steps were taken and an understanding was reached between SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem and the LTTE in April 2002. Mr. Hakeem said of these talks: "Solutions to several problems faced by Muslims have been found. This will calm the apprehension among our people about the peace process. A joint committee comprising representatives of LTTE and SLMC will be appointed to co-ordinate affairs related to the return of displaced Jaffna Muslims to their own homes." The agreement reached though did not translate into action, another indicator that negotiations and accords between protagonists are insufficient for resolving conflict situations. If states are not interested then civil society can take the initiative. The return of those forcibly evicted from the North is a thorn in the process of reconciliation and should be addressed as a matter of priority.

The Sinhala Question

The issues faced by the Sinhala communities in areas where they are a minority need to be understood and addressed. These include serious concern for the Human Security of Sinhalese in the Eastern Province, and a need to address the complications faced by Sinhalese who want to return to their homes in the North. The complexities of the issues faced by the Sinhalese can be reduced and engaged through civil society initiatives. In all these areas of concern frameworks can be created and a dialogue started with all parties to reduce intractability and move towards a process of transformation. This requires that all parties enter into a dialogic process to understand and comprehend the complexity of these situations.

Displaced Persons

Another intractable issue is the problem of the return and settlement of large numbers of Tamil refugees and internally displaced. The spontaneous return of refugees from India and the desires of the IDPs to return to their homes is a painful legacy of the war. The highest priority should be given to the resolution of this problem. The interim administrative proposals would go a long way in developing mechanisms for the resolution of this problem.

In particular, the problems of the High Security is a continuing eye sore to the peoples of the North East. The problem puts into sharp relief the dilemmas of State security and Human security. People who have been displaced from the High Security wish to return to their homes. Peace building means efforts to unravel this problem and find step-by-step approaches towards confidence building.

Human Rights in Conditions of Armed Conflict

The ongoing violation of Human Rights, including the Right to Life - "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." - is an unfortunate characteristic of transitions between war and peace. According to the SLMM records this includes 2604 violations committed. Furthermore, the death toll during the ceasefire period is indeed alarming; including continued political killings committed by the LTTE, political killings committed by Karuna forces, and political killings allegedly committed by the auxiliary forces of the government. It is important that efforts are made to ensure compliance of the Cease Fire Agreement by all parties. Low intensity warfare and covert operations erode confidence and degrade the right to life. Informal efforts should be made to ensure full compliance of the CFA and the SLMM should prepare a paper on how best these intractable issues should be resolved.

There are several examples of agreements on human rights, such as those in Guatemala and El Salvador. These should be seriously studied, for in these instances the agreements were made separately through many informal discussions outside the glare of publicity.

Another serious violation of the Ceasefire Agreement is the abduction of children by the LTTE. Constructive engagements and efforts of UNICEF have produced interesting agreements but the number of abductions is serious and has brought the attention of human rights organisations worldwide. Sustained dialogue needs to take place as to ways in which this problem can be resolved. What can we learn from other international experiences?

Fratricidal Killings Amongst Tamils

One of the more intractable aspects of such Human Rights violations is the fratricidal conflict within the Tamil community. Before and after the Thimpu talks the Tamil militants were more or less united for advancing the Tamil National question and advancing the right to self-determination. Over a period of time with the advent of the Indo-Lanka accord a divide took place between the LTTE and other militant movements who had decided to enter the democratic mains stream. The LTTE who eventually opposed the Indo-Lanka accord and faced military confrontation with the IPKF, described the other militants who were support of the Indo-Lanka accord as 'traitors' and 'mercenaries of the Indian Armed Forces and the Sri Lankan Government.'

What is tragic about this entire conflict is that while the LTTE claims to be a liberation movement, celebrating its martyrs, the rest of Tamil movements are described as provocateurs and mercenaries, or at best political opportunists of the Sinhala hegemonic state. At some time or other the deepening rift between these two entities needs to be recognised and resolved. Perhaps it may require an outsider or insider sympathetic to both elements to create an environment where a dialogue can begin. There are many examples in history where such mediation has occurred.

The Right to Language

Another intractable issue that need to be addressed in a road map to peace and reconciliation. For example implementation of the Tamil Language as a national language is one of the most neglected aspects of the denial of a fundamental rights of a people. The denial of the Tamil language as a national language was one of the main causes of the civil war. This problem still remains un-addressed. Even today large numbers of people both in the South and the Northeast are unable to conduct their business in Tamil. Implementation of the Tamil language as a national language will go a long way in the process of national reconciliation.

From Stalemate to Conflict Transformation

Whilst the Government of Sri Lanka pronounces that it is prepared for a Federal solution its practise continues to be the management of a strong hegemonic Sinhala state. No serious efforts have been undertaken to reform a moribund Administrative system. Over 95% of the administrative service is Sinhalese. Our local government structures and provincial government structures are equally moribund with no power or resources. Working towards dismantling a highly centralised state becomes a gigantic task which cannot be wished away.

Talks between the parties must certainly resume. We must find creative and determined alternatives, which involve the reconceptualisation of security towards human-centred and transformative approaches. In doing this we realise that the responsibility of transforming the Sri Lankan conflict lies not only in the leaders of the two parties at the talks, but in each of us as citizens and members of civil society.

04-12-2004


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